BURDEN OF PROOF (Part 5)

By Alexander Carson

 

    The distinction on which the Archbishop rests all the rites retained by the Reformation is indeed a very important one, but it is a distinction that has not the shadow of a support either in Scripture or in self-evident truth.  If a man is bound to show cause for every change, he is equally bound to do so with respect to every thing he retains.  He must submit evidence for every thing he holds, or be charged with the absurdity of believing without evidence.  If the Reformers renounced extreme unction because it was not instituted in Scripture, why did they retain infant baptism, or any other human invention?

   How could the Reformers disprove what they rejected?  Was it not by proving that the rejected doctrines and rites were not taught in Scripture?  And was not this as easily to be done with respect to many things, which they retained, as it was with respect to those they rejected?  And how was this to be done with respect to either, but by denying that they are in Scripture, and challenging their opponents to proof?  Were they to quote the whole Scriptures, sentence by sentence, showing as they proceeded that the rejected doctrines and rites were not there?  This absurdity is imported in the doctrine that proof lay with the Reformers.  It is a truth clear as the light of the sun, that, in every instance, proof lies with the affirmative, or with the holders of the doctrine or rite.

     But even if proof of the rites and institutions retained by the Reformers lay with their opponents, what is it they have to prove?  Is it not merely that the things objected to, are not instituted in Scripture?  But the Archbishop unjustly calls for the proof of a very different thing, a thing that in no case can be demanded.  He demands of the opponents of the rejected rite, or institution, "to show when it did arise."  I care not when it arose.  It is perfectly sufficient for my cause that it is not in Scripture.  Let its friends trace its genealogy.  This demand is arbitrary, unscriptural and irrational.  You might as well demand the author of the rite as the time of the introduction of the rite.  Do the Scriptures teach that every rite in existence is to be continued, unless the time of its introduction shall be ascertained?  Is it a self-evident truth that every thing ought to be retained as divine, which cannot be traced to its origin? Here is a forged bank note that has passed over half the kingdom, imposing on the best judges, but is at last rejected by the bank; will the Archbishop think himself bound to receive it in payment, unless he can trace it to its origin?  This bank note has pre-occupation, yet I will engage that his Grace will shift the burden of proof from his own shoul­ders.  His demand is not founded on any self-evident principle of evi­dence, but has been first invented for the very purpose of giving a sanction to the circulation of human forgeries in the kingdom of God.                                                          .

"The case of Episcopacy," says his Grace, "is exactly parallel; but Hooker seems to have overlooked this advantage: he sets himself to prove the apostolic origin of the institution, as if his task was to introduce it. Whatever force there may be in arguments so adduced, it is plain they must have far more force if the important presumption be kept in view, that the institution had notoriously existed many ages, and that consequently, even if there had been no direct evidence of its being as old as Christianity, it might fairly be at least supposed to be so, till some other period should be pointed out at which it had been introduced as an innovation."

   The case of episcopacy is, indeed, exactly parallel with that of infant baptism and equally groundless. Hooker showed his judgment in declining a mode of defense, which is so completely irrational. Epis­copacy, and every doctrine and institution must submit their proof; or be charged as being without proof. To prove an existing institution to be scriptural and to introduce, as scriptural, one that has been neglected demand the same process. The question to be discussed is whether the institution is in Scripture, not whether it is in practice among any denomination. What is the ground on which this distinction rests? Do the Scriptures teach that an institution in practical existence has a pre-occupation that entitles it to be received as Divine, until it is convicted of human origin? Is it a self-evident truth? No such thing: it is a figment forged to sanction the doctrines and traditions of men.

   But even if proof did lie on the opposer of episcopacy, what is he to prove? Surely nothing more than that it is not in Scripture. Yet the Archbishop puts him to another proof.  He obliges him to point out a period at which it arose as an innovation. I resist such a demand, as unscriptural, irrational, and without countenance from self-evident truth. No man, in order to disprove error, is obliged to hunt after its origin. If I knew the pedigree and the birth of episcopacy to a moment, I would not make use of my knowledge, without a caution that the thing is not necessary to my case.

   What is presumption in the explained sense of his Grace? It is a pre-occupation of the ground, that does not take the thing for granted, or mean that it is more likely than not. But what is this presumption about episcopacy? It is a presumption by which "it might fairly, at least, be supposed to be so, till," etc. Does not this take the thing for granted, till contrary proof is submitted?    

   In the foregoing extract it is assumed that if episcopacy existed at a certain period, it must be of Divine origin. This I deny. If I were writing against episcopacy, I would trample on the evidence with regard to its date. I care not if it was as old as Adam, if it is not appointed in the Scriptures. It is also insinuated that there is some degree of direct evidence for episcopacy. Does this mean Scripture evidence? Will the very learned and liberal Archbishop of Dublin venture to assert that the Scriptures make the bishop an officer superior to the presbyter?

   It is here supposed that the fact that episcopacy notoriously existed many ages is ground to believe that it is as old as Christianity, unless the period can be pointed out at which it had been introduced. The writer is universally acknowledged as the first logician in Europe; yet this is not logic. It might be as old as Christianity, and not be Christian: it might have existed many ages, and not be as old as Christianity, even though the period of its introduction could not be pointed out. Freemasonry has existed for many ages. Are we to believe the brotherhood that it is of Divine origin, or that it was instituted by Hiram the great architect of Solomon, unless we are able to trace its origin?

   “In the case of any doctrines, again," says the writer, "professing to be essential parts of the Gospel revelation, the fair presumption is that we shall find all such distinctly declared in Scripture."

   Here, it seems, his Grace abandons his defined sense of the word presumption, and uses it in the sense which he condemns—the common English sense, importing a degree of probability. I ask every reader whether this is not the sense in which he understands the words last quoted. Does he not mean that the thing referred to, is more probable, or more likely than the contrary? It respects not the burden of proof, nor pre-occupation of the ground; but the antecedent probability of the thing asserted. Why is the thing to be presumed? Is it not because of its probability?

   With respect to the assertion itself, while it is not only probable, but self-evidently true, that every thing revealed by God, will be revealed with a sufficient degree of clearness, and that every thing is revealed which he commands to be believed or practiced, yet as to the manner and degree of clearness of the revelation, there can be no just anticipa­tion. Here the anticipations of human wisdom have always failed. How a thing is to be revealed, we learn from the revelation, not from our own anticipations. It is sufficient if a truth, or duty, is revealed in any manner. Has the Archbishop a design of protecting, by his pre­sumption, disbelief of certain doctrines, as not being essential parts of revelation, because their opponents may allege that they are not dis­tinctly declared in Scripture?

"And again, in respect of commands or prohibitions, or to any point," says the author, "delivered by our Lord or his apostles, there is a pre­sumption that Christians are bound to obey." Why speak of this as a presumption? Can anything be more certain than that all the com­mands and prohibitions delivered by our Lord and his apostles are to be obeyed by those who profess subjection to him?

   "If anyone," continues the writer, "maintain on the ground of tra­dition the necessity of some additional articles of faith (as for instance that of purgatory) or the propriety of a departure from the New Testa­ment precepts (as for instance in the denial of the cup to the laity in the Eucharist) the burden of proof lies with him."

   In such cases, instead of calling for proof, I would assert that the things supposed are incapable of proof. It is assumed that the things referred to are not in Scripture but are additional articles of faith. Now, if the Scriptures are the only standard, how can anything not in the Scriptures, be proved from the Scriptures? If any man adds tra­dition to his standard, we have not a common standard, and cannot rea­son as to the conformity or nonconformity of certain doctrines to our standard. We must dispute, not about doctrines, but about the standard of our doctrines. If any one, professing to be guided by the New Testa­ment, asserts the propriety of a departure from New Testament precepts, I would not call on him for proof; I would assert that the thing is absurd. How can a standard teach that it is not a standard?

[To Be Concluded Next Week]