BURDEN OF PROOF (Part 4)

By Alexander Carson

     I have another observation.  His Grace says: "There is a presump­tion against every thing paradoxical."  Now I ask every reader, what is the sense that the English language naturally assigns to the word pre­sumption in this sentence?  Is it not a degree of antecedent probability? But this is not his Grace's meaning.  He means merely that the burden of proof lies with him who holds the paradox, without expressing any opinion of probability.  If my observation is just, his Grace has unnecessarily chosen to express himself in phraseology that is not English in the sense in which he uses it.  The expression is paradoxical.

     If it were not foreign to the present controversy, I would dispute his Grace's application of the word paradoxical.  He says, "Correct use is in favor of the etymological sense.”  It is my opinion, that correct English never uses the word for what is merely contrary to the prevail­ing belief.  Indeed in this respect there is no difference between vulgar and classical usage.  The word is never used, either by scholars or the illiterate, in the sense in which it is explained by this writer.  In its best sense, it always implies something at first sight incredible, or apparently false, or contradictory—never simply that a thing is contrary to the prevailing belief.  It is said, that his Grace has an opinion on the Sabbath, contrary to the prevailing belief; but I should consider it calum­nious, to assert that he holds a paradoxical opinion with regard to the Sabbath.  The most singular opinions are not paradoxical, simply from their singularity; I know, indeed, that one of the meanings assigned to this word by Dr. Johnson, coincides with that given by his Grace; but he has given no example for proof; and he gives the others, which this writer denies.  Paradox, Dr. Johnson explains as "a tenet contrary to received opinion; an assertion contrary to appearance; a position in appearance absurd."  From correct use, he exemplifies all but the first: that he does not exemplify, and I cannot think of an example in the English language.  It is given merely on the authority of etymology, which is no authority at all.  Mere contrariety to the prevailing opinion is not a paradox in the sense of the English language.  This is another proof of the necessity of caution in using the authority of lexicons.  If Dr. Johnson is guilty of such an inaccuracy in the account of the meaning of an English word, what may we not fear from lexicographers in dead or foreign languages?  Nothing but examples from a language can be ultimate proof of the meaning of words.  The authority of lexicographers and critics is only secondary.

“Accordingly," says his Grace, "there was a presumption against the Gospel in its first announcement."  In the English sense of the term, there was no presumption against the Gospel on its first announcement.  But I admit that proof lay on that side.  This, however, is not from any pre-occupation of ground on the other side; it was on the common, self-evident principle, that every doctrine or opinion must show its proof, e1se it must cease to have a rational existence.  He who denies it has nothing to do but refute what is alleged in its favor.  This holds universally.  Indeed, his Grace himself rests his assertion on the nature of the thing, and the self-evidence of the case, not on pre-occupation. "A Jewish peasant," says he, "claimed to be the promised Deliverer, in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.  The burden of proof lay with Him.  No one could be fairly called on to admit his pretensions till He showed cause for believing in Him."  Here the author does not rest on the authority of an arbitrary principle, but gives a reason for his assertion.  And if it is true, that "no one could be fairly called on to admit his pretensions till He showed cause for believing on Him," it is on the same ground, then, that no one can be fairly called on to believe anything till evidence is presented.

     "Now," continues the writer, "the case is reversed.  Christianity exists: and those who deny the Divine origin attributed to it, are bound to show some reasons for assigning to it a human origin."

     This indeed is a most chimerical principle.  The same doctrine is at one time bound to proof; at another it has the privilege of casting the burden of proof on the other side; from the mere circumstance of exis­tence.  Nothing can be more absurd.  If at first it is bound to proof, but as soon as it is received, it can cast the burden of proof on the other side, its reception must be evidence of its truth, or the ground of its reception is irrational and insufficient.  Now the presumption for which his Grace contends, is not of the nature of evidence at all.

     This doctrine is utterly without foundation.  Christianity is as much bound to proof this day, as it was the first day of its publication.  Its opponents are not "bound to show some reasons for assigning to it a human origin."  If they refute the arguments on which Christianity rests, they have done their business.  The establishment of Christianity considered in connection with its nature and means of propagation, is indeed evi­dence of its truth, but no reason to cast the burden of proof on its enemies.

     On what does such an arbitrary principle rest?  Do the Scriptures teach that as soon as any doctrine or position is established, or received, proof lies on the side of those who dispute it?  No such thing is pre­tended.  Is it a self-evident truth?  Instead of this, the author himself denies this presumption to be even a previous probability.  Every ulti­mate reason must be self-evident.  But here we have an ultimate reason that has not even the nature of evidence.

     His Grace rests on the simple existence of Christianity.  But did not Christianity exist from the first day of its reception by the first individual who received it?  According to this doctrine, then, with respect to all who from the first moment received it, proof lay on the other side. Besides, with respect to infidels and all who have not received Christianity, proof must still lie on it.  They must not give up their old systems till proof is submitted.  There is nothing but concessions on this principle of settling the burden of proof.  Christianity on the ground of its existence rests the burden of proof on those who dispute it; yet all who dispute it have the same reason to cast the burden of proof upon it.  Their belief had, with respect to themselves a previous existence.  If each has a right to cast the burden of proof upon the other, they never can contend.

     The author himself forsakes his own principle, and in the following passage, gives a reason why the burden of proof should now lie on the opposers of Christianity.  "The burden of proof," says he, "now lies plainly on him who rejects the Gospel; which, if it were not established by miracles, demands an explanation of the greater miracle, its having been established in defiance of all opposition, by human contrivance."  Here instead of relying on simple existence, he relies on miraculous propagation, in defiance of all opposition.  This indeed is an argument in proof of the truth of Christianity—not a reason to relieve it from the burden of proof.

    "The burden of proof, again," says the Archbishop, "lay on the authors of the Reformation: they were bound to show cause for every change they advocated; and they admitted the fairness of this requisition, and accepted the challenge.  But they were not bound to show cause for retaining what they left unaltered.  The presumption was, in these points, on their side; and they had only to reply to objections. This important distinction is often lost sight of; by those who look at the ‘doctrines, etc., of the Church of England as constituted at the Reformation,’ in the mass, without distinguishing the altered from the unaltered parts.  The framers of the Articles kept this in mind in their expression respecting infant baptism that it ought by all means to be retained. They did not introduce the practice, but left it as they found it, considering the burden to lie on those who denied its existence in the primitive church, to show when it did arise."

     The burden of proof did not lie on the Reformers.  They, who held the established doctrine and rites at that time, were bound to show that they are the doctrines and rites of the New Testament.  The business of the Reformers was to refute any arguments from Scripture alleged in Support by their opponents.  What is the thing controverted?  Is it not whether certain doctrines and rites are instituted in Scripture? If this protestant Archbishop receive the common protestant maxim, the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, he cannot controvert this.  And if this is the controversy, is it not necessarily the business of those who hold them to be in Scripture, to produce the proof that they are in Scripture?  The business of the other is to refute the alleged evidence. This is a self-evident truth.  If any doctrine, or rite, declines to show its proof, from the admitted standard, it necessarily falls to the ground for want of proof.  To deny it is to disprove it.  If it will not bear the burden of proof, it is unproved.  The opposers of it have nothing to do. They cannot refute proof that is not submitted to them.  If pre-occupa­tion is rested on, that pre-occupation must either be evidence, or the thing is believed without evidence.  But pre-occupation is not proof; and the Archbishop himself does not make it even probability.

     Besides, as soon as the Reformers had received their new system, that system, with respect to themselves, had pre-occupation.  It was in possession, and according to the Archbishop’s doctrine, they had a right to cast the burden of proof on the other side.  There is confusion in the Archbishop's doctrine, which I am surprised to find in the views of so great a logician.  Pre-occupation he at one time applies with reference to the date of the doctrine or institution, at another with reference to the reception of the doctrine or rite by individuals.  He grants the privilege of pre-occupation to every man with respect to his own system, or the system of his party.  There is nothing akin in these two pre-occupations.

[To Be Continued Next Week]